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Abstract
This paper examines empirically how the demand of foreign exchange
derivatives by Brazilian corporations is related to their exchange rate ex-
posure. With the help of an original database of 74,567 contracts written
from 1999 to 2002 between corporations and financial institutions, we
were able to identify the corporations that speculated and the ones that
hedged with foreign exchange derivatives during this period. Our results
show that the exchange rate exposure is positively related to the foreign
operational exposures for firms that speculated and negatively related for
firms that hedged in 2002. For the other years of the sample period, spec-
ulation or hedge did not affect the relationship between the exchange rate
exposure and the foreign operational exposure of firms.
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Resumo
Este artigo analisa empiricamente como a demanda de derivativos de
câmbio por firmas brasileiras está relacionada as suas exposições cambi-
ais. Com a ajuda de um banco de dados original de 74.567 contratos entre
firmas e instituições financeiras de 1999 a 2002, somos capazes de identi-
ficar que empresas especularam e que empresas fizeram hedge durante o
período. Nossos resultados mostram que a exposição operacional cambial
das firmas está positivamente relacionada com a exposição cambial das
firmas que especularam e negativamente relacionada com as firmas que
fizeram hedge em 2002. Para os outros anos do período amostral, a es-
peculação ou hedge não afetaram a relação entre a exposição operacional
cambial e a exposição operacional das firmas brasileiras.
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ções.
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1 Introduction
Brazil changed its foreign exchange regime in 1999 from a fixed exchange
regime to a floating exchange regime. This change increased the foreign ex-
change exposure of corporations in Brazil. Not only did corporations, in gen-
eral terms, started to export and import more, but they also issued more for-
eign exchange debt. In response to this, corporations increased their demand
for foreign exchange derivatives as Oliveira (2004) shows.1
Novaes & Oliveira (2007) point out that the demand for foreign exchange
derivatives of corporations in Brazil during the period from 1999 to 2002 were
of two kinds. One was to protect the cash flows of these corporations from
relevant depreciations of the exchange rate, therefore for hedging purposes.
The other was to obtain financial gains from the depreciation of the foreign
exchange rate, which is for speculative reasons.2
The purpose of this paper is to study how the demand for foreign exchange
derivatives of corporations both for hedge and speculation affected their ex-
change rate exposure from 1999 to 2002. We are particularly interested in
the year 2002, in which due to the presidential election process the foreign
exchange rate depreciated almost 60% from January to December of 2002. Of
course, the incentives for speculation and hedge in an economy like this get
much pronounced.3
Our results show that the exchange rate exposure of corporations is pos-
itively related to the foreign operational exposure- defined as the difference
between total exports and the sum of total imports and foreign exchange debt
— for firms that speculated and negatively related for firms that hedged in
2002. However, firms that had negative operational exposure and that did not
hedge had a negative correlation between this exposure and their exchange
rate exposure.
We compare our results of the year 2002 with the results of hedge and spec-
ulation of the years from 1999 to 2001. In these years the foreign exchange
rate was much less volatile and average depreciation much less significant
than in 2002. What we observe is that clearly 2002 is a very unique year as
far as speculation and hedge is concerned. Not only the number of firms that
1Brazil’s currency, the real, is nonconvertible, so it is not available for trade on the foreign
exchange market and cannot be bought or sold outside Brazil. The Banco Central do Brasil main-
tains close control of the Brazilian currency market through Sisbacen, the Central Bank’s infor-
mation system. The system functions as a virtual environment where currency transactions and
operations are officially authorized and conducted. Import and export operations must follow
specific rules with regard to currency transactions. They include preparing contracts, document-
ing transactions and getting approval from Sisbacen. Almost all types of currency operations can
be handled through a commercial bank or by local exchange brokers. Brazil is renowned for its
range of regulatory and legal requirements, although some of these protectionist features have
helped to insulate the country from the worst effects of the recent global financial crisis.
2The basic strategies to manage exchange rate risks in Brazil are similar to those used all over
the world. Companies are subject to exchange rate fluctuations that can impact profitability and
cash flows. But this currency volatility usually can be managed through derivatives, especially
hedge contracts. Themost common contracts are swaps, future, forward, and options. Operations
with derivatives can be done through major banks. The main Brazilian provider of this type of
financial services is BM&F-BOVESPA, the Brazilian stock exchange.
3Figure A.1 shows the dynamics of the foreign exchange rate in Brazil from 1999 to 2002. As
one can see, in 2002 the exchange rate increased sharply, from R$ 2.31 per dollar in January to R$
3.50 per dollar in December — a depreciation of 60.0%, which in part was due to uncertainties
regarding the presidential elections. Therefore, the year 2002 seems to be a good candidate to
capture uses of foreign exchange derivatives for speculation as well as for hedge.
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speculated and hedged from 1999 to 2001 is much less than the number of
firms that speculated or hedged in 2002, but also the total demand of foreign
exchange derivatives is much less. We show that during these years specula-
tion or hedge did not matter for the relationship between the exchange rate
exposure and the foreign involvement of corporations measured by their op-
erational exposure.
To obtain our results, we built an original database of 74,567 contracts of
foreign exchange swaps written between corporations and financial institu-
tions from January 1999 to December 2002. Of these 25,457 are open at the
end of 2002. This database allows us to identify the use of foreign exchange
derivatives in order to hedge and in order to speculate from 1999 to 2002.
The data used in this study is obtained from confidential information of
the Brazilian Central Bank. Additional available data from the two institu-
tions that register the total volume of operations of foreign exchange derivates
in Brazil — the Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&F) and the Center
for Custody of Private Securities (CETIP) — show that, between 1999 and
2002, the contracts for exchange of interest denominated in BRL for dollar-
denominated interest (foreign exchange swaps) were by far the most impor-
tant instrument of foreign exchange derivatives used by companies with oper-
ations in Brazil.
Based on this information, the Brazilian Central Bank solicited 50 autho-
rized financial institutions that operate in the foreign exchange derivatives
to inform the name of all the companies with which they signed contracts of
foreign exchange swap from January 1999 to December 2002 as well as the
notional amount, currency and maturity of these contracts.
In response to these information solicited by the Central Bank, 43 financial
institutions described details of 74,567 contracts of foreign exchange swaps.
Of these 25,457 were still outstanding at the end of 2002.
We show that 93 corporations had currency swaps positions open at the
end of 2002. Of these 93 corporations, 16 held speculative positions for swaps
that increased their foreign exchange risk. More precisely, these companies
held open positions in swaps contrary to their operational currency exposure
(difference between export revenues in dollars and the sum of imports ex-
penses in dollars and debt in dollars). That is, companies that, due to oper-
ational currency exposure, lost (gained) with an appreciation (depreciation)
of the exchange rate are long (short) in swaps, magnifying these monetary
losses. On the other hand, of the 93 companies with contracts for open cur-
rency swaps 53 intended to diminish their currency exposure. Among these
companies that hedged, 35,84% are concentrated in the utilities sector and all
have dollar-denominated debt.
To study how the foreign exchange rate affected the value of firms we se-
lected the group of 50 firms out of our group of 93 firms with more liquid
stocks in Brazil in 2002.4 The number of these firms that speculated with
these swaps was 14 and the number of firms that hedged was 36.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 presents the theoretical background of the relation between the ex-
change rate and the market value of firms that speculated or hedged. Section
4 presents the main empirical analysis. Section 5 shows the robustness tests
and section 6 concludes.
4Not many corporations in Brazil have liquid stocks.
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2 The Data
Our primary data source is a unique database, composed of 74,567 contracts
of currency swaps signed between 1999 and 2002 between 43 financial insti-
tutions and non-financial corporations in Brazil. These contracts correspond
to nearly 98% of the total volume of currency swaps transacted in 2002.5
In order to understand the importance of our database, we need to explain
briefly the prevailing structure of the Brazilian foreign exchange derivatives
market from 1999 to 2002. There were various types of foreign exchange
derivatives used by firms and financial institutions: public bonds indexed to
the dollar, operations with foreign exchange futures, options and forwards. In
the currency swap contracts, the investor in the long position trades interest
in BRL for dollar-denominated interest; this implies gains (losses) with depre-
ciation (appreciation) of the exchange rate.
The initial demand for public bonds indexed to the dollar was made by
the financial institutions and was registered in the System of Liquidation and
Custody of Federal Public Securities (SELIC). The other derivatives were reg-
istered at Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&F) or at the Center for
Custody of Public Securities (CETIP).
The main contracts of registered firms at BM&F were future contracts
and dollar options. According to available data at BM&F in 2002, dollar-
denominated future contracts were only liquid for maturities within 20 days
and their open total daily stock was almost always less than 3% of total open
stock of currency swaps between firms and financial institutions registered
at CETIP. Dollar options were even less liquid and present daily stock levels
even lower than those of dollar-denominated future contracts.
The fact that currency swaps were the main instrument of foreign ex-
change derivatives used by corporations can be explained in part by simply
observing the data. The data show that a great number of corporations that
used foreign exchange derivatives had debt in a foreign currency. In general,
this debt has middle to long-term maturities, with disbursement of interests
done irregularly. Futures contracts, options or forward contracts of foreign
exchange with long maturities are, in general, not liquid or inexistent, arising
from this the need for corporations to demand counter operations, such as
swaps, which better reflect the cash flow of their external obligations.6
The total volume of transacted currency swaps between firms and finan-
cial institutions is quite superior to the volume negotiated among non-finan-
cial firms. This fact is not peculiar to Brazil. Mian (1996) shows that, in the
majority of countries, non-financial corporations seek financial institutions
as the other party in their derivatives operations. Available data of the CETIP
show that, between 1999 and 2002, the daily stock of currency swaps among
corporations is on average 3% of the daily stock of currency swaps done be-
tween financial institutions and corporations. Among the currency swaps,
those for which the US dollar is one of the objects of operation represent more
5The Central Bank initially solicited information from 50 financial institutions. Some of
these institutions were purchased by others of the group of 50, between 1999 and 2002. The
purchasing financial institutions became responsible for the information regarding the contracts
for currency swaps of those institutions that were purchased. This explains why the number of
institutions that responded the initial request was 43 and not 50.
6Other possible explanations are: the swaps do not need collateral (which is required by
BM&F); they do not suffer daily adjusts and they also do not require an initial payment.
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than ninety-five percent of the total volume negotiated.7 Therefore, the Cen-
tral Bank’s database of US dollar-based currency swaps is fairly representative
of the demand for foreign currency derivatives of Brazilian companies.
The empirical analysis will have as its focus the corporations that had open
positions in currency swaps at the end of 2002. To get an idea of the kind
of corporations we are dealing with, we compare them with the following
control group: all of the non-financial corporations that do not pertain to
the same economic group and have some form of exchange rate exposure.8
We consider a firm having exchange rate exposure if it has debt in foreign
exchange, or exports or imports or is a part of a sector of the economy that
has foreign exchange exposure. This group consists of 250 corporations that
together with those that had open positions in currency swaps at the end of
2002, 93 corporations, comprise a total of 343 corporations.9
Table B.1 shows the financial characteristics of the corporations that had
open positions and of those that do not. The corporations with open positions
are larger, show more debt in US dollars, have greater ratios of external rev-
enue to gross revenue and have more executives participating in the profits.
In all of these cases, the hypothesis of average equality is rejected at the 5%
significance level.
Of the 93 corporations in our sample, 7 (7.13%) are multinationals. These
corporations probably have a natural demand to hedge in order to protect the
investment of their shareholders in the country of origin from fluctuations of
the nominal exchange rate. By taking themultinationals out of the sample, the
only difference is that the corporations with open positions in currency swaps
in 2002 become smaller than those corporations without open positions. Next,
we define which of these corporations hedged or which speculated. The cor-
porations that hedged are those for whom the product between the open net
position in currency swaps and what we call operational currency exposure
(the difference between export revenues in dollars and the sum of the imports
expenses and debt in dollars) is less than zero. This product can be negative in
two cases: when a corporation has an operational currency exposure greater
than zero and tries to protect itself from a currency appreciation taking short
positions in dollars; and when it has an operational currency exposure less
than zero and tries to protect itself from a currency depreciation taking long
positions in dollars.
The corporations that speculated were those that the product of the op-
erational currency exposure and the net open position of the currency swap
was greater than zero. This case includes the corporations whose value would
diminish due to currency depreciation, even when they opted for short posi-
tions in currency swap contracts, and those whose value would increase with
a currency appreciation and would nonetheless remain in long positions in
currency swaps.
In order to find the open net position of the firm in currency swaps, we
transform all the values in BRL to dollars, using the exchange rate of the
7A great majority of these contracts have maturities of less than two years and on the other
end of the contract are pre and post-fixed interest rates.
8The selection has as base financial statements of the exercise of 2002, which became public
and available at the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CMV). We choose those that divulged all
the necessary accounting information.
9Close to 90% of businesses in the sample are among the 1000 largest Brazilian companies in
terms of net revenue in the year 2002, according to the annual Valor 1000 of August 2003.
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date the operation. Next, we verify all of the open operations at the end of
2002 (long and short) and we find the net position of each corporation as the
difference between the total volume in dollars of the long positions and the
total volume in dollars of short operations. Table C.1 presents a classification
by sectors of the corporations that hedged or that speculated, and shows the
form they chose (long or short positions), in addition to information about the
operational currency exposure of each of the different sectors.
Table C.1 shows that the number of corporations that speculated was less
than the number of corporations that hedged. All of the corporations that
speculated held long positions in dollars. This suggests expectations of cur-
rency depreciation. This occurs even among predominantly export sectors,
such as food products and beverages. In terms of hedge, we can see that all
corporations were also long in dollars. Corporations that hedged were primar-
ily from the utilities sector. This is the sector that in the aggregate shows the
most significant debt in foreign exchange relative to its assets.
There are some sectors in which the average of the ratio between the value
of open net positions in currency swaps and net worth were relevant. This
occurred, both in the case of hedge (8.0% in the case of Electro/Electronic) and
in the case of (4.0% for the food and beverage sector). Given that the firms of
these sectors were long in dollars, this fact reveals, once again, the expectation
on the part of the firms of substantial currency depreciation during 2002.
Table C.2 shows that debt in dollars were ubiquitous among corporations
that did hedge. All of them had debt in dollars and negative operational expo-
sure. In addition, Table C.3 shows that firms that export predominated in the
case of speculation. Some of these firms also showed some imports expenses
and debt in dollars, but in volumes inferior to those of their exports revenues.
Finally, Table C.4 shows that 84.94% of the corporations that speculated or
that hedged are private domestic firms, whereas only 7.93% are state-owned
and 7.13% are multinationals. This proves that the decisions to hedge or spec-
ulate were made primarily by domestic agents.
Appendix Appendix E show the number and sectors of firms that specu-
lated and hedged from1999 to 2001 respectively with foreign exchange swaps.
Table D.1 shows that the number of firms that speculated in 1999 was 6. Like-
wise in 2002, most corporations that hedged came from the utilities sector
of the economy. Most of the corporations that hedged came from the elec-
tro/electronic sector of the economy.
Table D.2 shows the number of firms that speculated and hedged with for-
eign exchange exposure in 2000. The number of firms that hedged during the
period was 32. The number of firms that speculated was 5. Most corporations
that hedged came from the utilities sector and most corporations that specu-
lated came from the eletro/electronic sector. Interesting to note is that some
firms that speculated in this year held short positions in the foreign exchange.
Table D.3 shows the number of firms that speculated and hedged with
foreign exchange exposure in 2001. The number of firms that hedged was
40 and all were long in the foreign exchange rate. The number of firms that
speculated was 13. Once more, most of the firms that hedged came from the
utilities of public services. Most of the firms that speculated came from food
and beverages sector of the economy.
As far as hedge is concerned, Appendix Appendix E shows that the behav-
ior of firms in the years from 1999 to 2001 was similar to those firms that
hedged in 2002. All had negative operational exposure, basically related to
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a high level of foreign exchange debt, and took long position in foreign ex-
change swaps. However, speculation in these years differed a little bit from
speculation in 2002. In most cases, corporations that speculated were ex-
porters that held long positions in foreign exchange rate. But in rare cases,
notably in 2000 when the volatility of the exchange rate was very low, some
prefered speculating with the appreciation of the exchange rate.
Finally, Table E.1 shows the financial characteristics of the 50 firms of our
group of 93 firms with more liquid stocks in Brazil at the end of 2002. It also
shows mean tests of the comparisons between the characteristics of this group
and the control group of 250 firms and the group of 93 firmswith open foreign
exchange swap positions in 2002. We use the liquidity index defined by Econo-
matica.10,11 Not many corporations in Brazil have liquid stocks. Amongst the
more liquid stocks there are several preferred and ordinary stocks of the same
firm. Of the 50 firms, 14 speculated and 36 hedged. All firms held long po-
sitions in foreign exchange swaps. Table C.3 shows that the group of firms
with more liquid stocks were larger firms, with more external debt and more
export revenues than the other two groups.
3 The Exchange Rate Exposure and the Foreign Exchange
Involvement
In this section, we study how the exchange rate is related to the market value
of firms what we define as exchange rate exposure. Then we study how the
exchange rate exposure is related to foreign operational exposure of firms and
with their demand of derivatives for hedge or speculation.
Foreign exchange exposure can be decomposed into the effect of net mone-
tary assets with fixed nominal payoffs and the value of real assets held by the
firm. If we abstract from inflation uncertainty, short-term foreign monetary
assets are in general fully exposed to exchange risk whereas domestic mon-
etary assets are not. This is usually called translation exposure. Real assets
however will be affected in value by foreign exchange movements, whatever
their location. Thus purely domestic firms, like utilities, may be affected by
the exchange rate movements, through effects on aggregate demand or on the
cost of traded inputs; domestic firms that sell goods competing with imports
will also be exposed to exchange rate movements.
10The Economatica system is a powerful and user-friendly tool designed for the analysis of
equities and investment funds. It consists of a suite of advanced analytical modules which op-
erate on top of a comprehensive and extremely reliable database. The system offers information
on companies listed on the exchanges of United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru,
Colombia and Venezuela. The user can subscribe to the complete database or to only the coun-
tries of interest. The database provides many years of historical data: — Quarterly Financial
Statements Daily Stock Prices Corporate Actions (dividends, splits, etc.)The Economatica system
calculates various types of indicators: — Financial indicators (ROE, ROIC, debt to equity ratio,
etc); Fundamental indicators (P/E, EV/EBITDA, Dividend Yield, etc.);Statistical indicators (beta,
volatility, liquidity, Sharpe, etc.) — Graphical indicators (RSI, stochastics, Bollinger bands, etc.).
The data can be expressed in different currencies or adjusted by inflation indices. Also available
are the historical series of macroeconomic and financial indicators. The historical pricing series
are adjusted for corporate actions (dividends, splits, etc.).
11Stock Liquidity index of Economatica is defined as: 100 ∗ pP ∗
√
n
N ∗ vV , where: p(small) =
number of days in which there were at least 1 trade of the stock during the period; P(max) = total
number of days in the period; n(small) = number of trades of the stock during the period; N (max)
= total number of trades of all the stocks in the period; v(small) = volume in monetary terms of
the stock in the period V (max) = total volume in monetary terms of all the stocks in the period
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The literature has identified several market imperfections or frictions that
may justify the use of foreign exchange derivatives for hedging or speculative
reasons so as to add market value to firms.
Smith & Stulz (1985) argue that a hedge is a method bymeans of which cor-
porations can reduce the volatility of their cash flow. The choice to hedge oc-
curs more frequently among firms with greater costs of bankruptcy or greater
probabilities of bankruptcy.
Myers (1977) demonstrates that indebted businesses have distorted incen-
tives in terms of their policies for investment. To summarize, the distortion
occurs due to the priority that the creditors have over the shareholders for
receiving cash flow generated by corporations. Given this priority, the share-
holders do not have incentives to contribute resources for investments whose
returns-because of the highly indebted situation-will likely be used in the pay-
ment of debt. Excessive debt, however, can impede lucrative projects from
being implemented. Thus, creditors anticipate the conflict of interest and in-
corporate their costs in the interest rate.
Mayers & Smith (1982) show that a hedge reduces the probability of a
company not fulfilling its obligations, thus reducing the probability that the
investments are distorted, consequently, benefiting the shareholders through
the reduction of the interest rate. Hedging, therefore, takes a firm’s invest-
ment policy closer to that which maximizes the firm’s value.
On the other hand Jensen & Meckling (1976) argue that business with
great amounts of debt can choose excessively risky investments. Following
this thread, Géczy et al. (1997) show that costs of agency with creditors can
induce the businesses to speculate. This can occur if shareholders turn their
shares into options above the value of a leveraged firm, speculating to increase
the volatility of the firm’s cash flow when close to bankruptcy.
We have, therefore, two conflicting forecasts. On the one hand, Mayers &
Smith (1982) argue that corporations highly in debt are more likely to hedge.
On the other hand, Géczy et al. (1997) argue that corporationswith significant
debt have greater incentive to speculate. In order to determine which of these
effects prevail, we use two variables to capture costs of a suboptimal invest-
ment policy: the ratio between the total value of fixed assets and the size of
the corporation and the ratio of the market value of corporation and its book
value.
In contrast, a high ratio between a corporation’smarket value and the book
value suggests that future gains (embedded in the market value of the firm’s
shares) still do not correspond to the value of the existing assets. Such a corpo-
ration should have greater difficulty offering real collateral to creditors com-
patible with the profitability of the existing investment opportunities. Thus,
we expect a positive relationship between the ratio of the market value and
book value and the probability of hedging or speculation.
Another characteristic of a firm related to its cost of agency with creditors
is its size. Larger firms, in general, have greater reputation, a fact that can
reduce the costs of agency. Therefore, we can expect that the size, defined as
above, reduce the probability of the firm using hedge or speculation.
De Marzo & Duffie (1991) suggest that corporations with greater asym-
metry of information between executives and shareholders can obtain larger
profits by hedging. De Marzo and Duffie are concerned with the sharehold-
ers’ capacity to choose from their portfolios of assets. Hedging reduces the
volatility of the companies’ cash flow that, in turn, reduces the uncertainties
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of the shareholders’ set of information. Consequently, the shareholders accept
a hedge because this improves their portfolio choices. As an empirical approx-
imation for asymmetric information between executives and shareholders we
use the number of institutional investors of the firm. The idea is that institu-
tional investors invest in the acquisition of information diminishing the un-
certainty about the value of the firms in their portfolios. Therefore, a great
number of institutional investors indicate a lesser probability of the firm per-
forming a hedge.
The volatility of their compensation imposes costs to executives or con-
trollers contrary to risk. Stulz (1984) and Smith & Stulz (1985) argue that if
the optimum contracts for compensation of executives or controllers contrary
to risk are related to the volatility of the corporation’ revenue or cash flow,
these volatilities can be costly for these agents. If the executives or controllers
do not manage to hedge on their own, or if it is up to the corporations to
choose to hedge, then a hedge done by the firm can increase the well being of
the administrators.
We use one variable as approximations for the executive’s risk exposure:
one binary variable equal to one if the executive has participation in profit and
zero otherwise. The participation in profits is obtained by the firms’ financial
statements provided by CVM.12
Mian (1996) argues that risk management programs by means of deriva-
tives can present initiation, implementation and maintenance costs. If these
costs are significant, a company may not use these programs. Such costs
present economies of scale related to the size of the firm. Therefore, the size
of the firm-measured by the log of assets-can be positively related to the prob-
ability of hedging or the probability of speculation.
In our regressions, we use as a control variable a binary variable equal to
one if the firm is multinational and zero otherwise. Multinational corpora-
tions can be interested in protecting the interests of shareholders in the ori-
gin country against fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate, even without
possessing export revenues, import expenses or debt in dollars. In this case,
multinational firms should be more likely to use a hedge and less likely to
speculate.
Corporations with revenues from exports or expenses from imports are
natural candidates to speculate with foreign exchange derivatives. The na-
ture of their activities, makes these corporations follow regularly the foreign
exchange market, maintaining close contact with agents that are probably the
first to detect changes in the trends of the nominal exchange rate (dealers of
foreign currency, for example). Therefore, they can participate in the foreign
exchange market using privileged information. Our a priori is that corpora-
tions, which have relative relevant export revenues are more likely to specu-
late.
There is growing empirical evidence on the use of foreign exchange deriva-
tives. Mian (1996) finds substantial use of hedging activity. Géczy et al. (1997)
find in a sample of Fortune 500 firms that 52.1% use currency derivatives,
44.2 use interest rate derivatives, while only 11.3% use commodity deriva-
12The empirical literature makes use of the total shares or of the total volume of options of
shares of the corporations in the hands of the executives to study the relationship between the
volatility of their compensation and the cash flow of corporations. Such variables are not available
in Brazil.
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tives. Novaes & Oliveira (2007) show that many corporations in Brazil use
currency derivatives to speculate.
Although there are numerous studies that theorize as to the value of hedg-
ing or speculation and a large number of studies that document the size and
scope of theses activities, very few studies examine the relationship between
the use of currency derivatives and the market value of firms. One of the rare
studies is Allayanis & Ofek (2001). They confirm the widespread use of cur-
rency derivatives: 42.6% of their sample of 378 firms use currency derivatives
and on average cover 14.5% of foreign sales.
We use a two step regressionmethodology to measure the relation between
foreign exchange exposure and the market value of firms, similar to Allayanis
& Ofek (2001). However our methodology is different from Allayanis and
Ofek regarding the second step regressions as we will explain below.
The first regression is very standard in the literature. We regress for each
of our 50 firms of our initial group of 93 firms with more liquid stocks at the
end of 2002 their daily return on the depreciation of the exchange rate and the
return of a market index, the IBovespa, as in equation (1). We are interested
in the coefficient of the depreciation of the exchange rate, that we from now
call the exchange rate exposure of the firm. We repeat the estimation (1) for
all firms in the four years, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 and find four distinct
betas for each firm, one for every year of the sample.
Rit = β0 + βf△f xt + βMRMt + ut , t = 1991,2000,2001 and 2002, i = 1,50 (1)
where: Rit is the daily return of the stock of the firms, △ f xt is the daily
depreciation of the exchange rate and RMt is the daily return of the IBovespa
index and ut is a white noise disturbance. We estimate these regressions for
every year using OLS; βf measures the exchange rate exposure.
In the second step regressions, we use the following cross section regres-
sion (2) for each year:
βf it = δ0 + δ1opsit + δ2 (spec ∗ ops)it + δ3 (hedge ∗ ops)it + δ4 (size)it +
δ5multit + δ6partit + δ7iiit + δ8f ixedassetsit + δ9mvbvit + uit ,
t = 2002,2001,2000,1999 e i = 1,50
(2)
The betas are the exchange rate exposures obtained in equation (1) above.
We regress them for every year against the following variables related to the
theoretical reasons for firms to speculate and hedge with foreign exchange
derivatives: ops is operational exposure, defined as the difference between
exports and the sum of imports and foreign exchange debt; spec is equal to 1
if the firms speculated, hedge is equal to 1 if the firm hedged; mult is equal to
one if the firm is multinational; fixedassets is the total fixed assets of the firm
divided by total assets; size is the the log of the total assets of the firms; mvbv
is the quotient between the market value of firms and their book value; part
is one if the executives have participation in the profits of the firms; ii are the
number of institutional investors of the firms.
In the next section we will show our estimations of our two step regres-
sions methodology presented above.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Exchange Rate Exposure
We start presenting the results of the first step regressions, equation (1). We es-
timate equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We repeat the regres-
sion for all years from 1999 to 2002. Table F.1 describes the several exchange
rate exposures, or βf , obtained. In all regressions we correct for heterocedas-
ticity and serial correlation using Newey & West (1987) when necessary.
Our results are similar to others in the literature, such as Jorion (1990) for
example. There are a great number of non-significant betas. In all years posi-
tive betas are related to firms that have positive operational exposure and neg-
ative beats are related to firms that had negative operational exposure. Due
to the great number of non-significant betas, we consider important to verify
if all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Equal coefficients could also re-
veal the endogenous nature of the relation between stock prices and exchange
rates, which in this case could be unrelated to the foreign exchange exposure.
To do this, we perform a weighted least square estimation of a system of equa-
tions for each one of the years and for the whole sample. Table F.2 shows the
results for 4 categories we select: the whole sample, the 30 more liquid stocks,
only the firms that speculated and only the firms that hedged. The hypothesis
of equal coefficients to zero is rejected for all groups defined and in all years.
4.2 The Determinants of the Exchange Rate Exposure
We now move on to the presentation and analysis of the results of our second
step regressions. The results of the OLS estimations are presented in Table
G.1. As the Table shows, the p-values of the F statistics of the test of the
joint significance do not reject the overall significance of the variables. Al-
though they are not reported in the table, we also do several diagnosis tests
for omitted variables. In particular, we include squared terms of the indepen-
dent variables that are not dummy variables and verify that the coefficients
of these additional variables are not collectively different from zero.13 These
tests indicate a correct specification of the model.
Column A of Table G.1 shows the results with all the control variable we
mentioned above that we consider important to explain how speculation and
hedge relate to the market value of firms. Column B shows the results of the
estimation for a more simplified specification, containing only operational
exposure and the interaction variables between hedge and speculation and
operational exposure.
Let us start with speculation. All firms that speculated had positive op-
erational exposure and positive exchange rate exposure. The sum of the co-
efficients of the speculation interaction term with operational exposure for
the more complete specification is 0.23 with p-value of 0.04. This means that
speculation increased the exchange exposure of firms in 2002 as we would
imagine. This continues to hold in the more simplified specification. For the
more simplified specification we see that the sum of the two coefficients con-
tinues to be positive, 0.67, and significant p-value of 0.04.
13For example, for the mentioned estimation for the probability to hedge, the p-value of the
test for omitted variables is 0.35, whereas for the estimation for the probability to speculate the
p-value is 0.22.
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Now we look at the firms that hedged. As we pointed out above all firms
that hedged had negative operational exposure and negative exchange rate
exposure. The sum of the operational exposure with the term that interacts
with the hedge variable is negative, −0.24, and significant, p-value 0.04. This
means that firms that hedged observed a negative relation between their for-
eign exchange involvement and their exchange rate exposure. This means
that hedge helped these firms cope with the high level of depreciation of the
exchange rate in 2002. On the contrary, firms that did not hedge and had an
increase in their negative operational exposure-related to an increase in their
foreign exchange debt for example- observed an increase in absolute terms in
their foreign exchange exposure. This continues to be evident also in the more
simplified specification, where the sum is −0.34 and p-value of 0.0.
Economies of scale also affect positively the exchange rate exposure, as the
value and p-value of the coefficient in columns (A) makes clear: the coefficient
is 9.22 and p-value 0.09.
The fact that a firm is multinational affects negatively the exchange rate
exposure: the coefficient is −1.11 and p-value of 0.07. It was what we expect a
priori, given that, as we have already argued, multinationals possess natural
demand to hedge.
The data do not identify aversion of risk of executives or controllers as a de-
terminant in the choice to hedge. The participation in profits and the number
of institutional investors were also not significant in affecting the probability
to hedge. Finally, the quotient between the market value of the firm and its
book value is also non significant.
Concluding, we can confirm that, in 2002, the results of our estimations
furnish evidence that speculation increased the exchange rate exposure and
hedge decreased it. Following, we look if these results continue to be the same
in other years of our sample.
4.3 Analyzing the Influence of Hedge and Speculation in Other Years
In this section, we want to compare the year 2002 with the other years of
our sample period to see if the relation between the foreign exchange and the
market value of firms continues to be same as in 2002. Between 1999 and
2001, the volatility of the exchange rate was much lower than it was during
2002. Even in 1999, the currency crisis occurred in the beginning of the year
and lasted for much less time than the currency crisis in 2002. Therefore, the
incentives, especially for speculation, are quite different than those of 2002.
We look at open foreign exchange swaps at the end of each year. We con-
sider the net position, long minus shot in foreign exchange. We use again the
same definition as before for hedge and speculation, reverse or neutral.
Our results for the year 2001 are in presented in Table H.1. As we can see,
the results are different from the ones we obtained for 2002, as column (A)
with the more complete specification shows. Both hedge and speculation do
not affect anymore the relation between the exchange rate and the foreign
exchange involvement. The coefficient of operational exposure is positive,
which means that exporters in these years with less foreign debt and imports
observed a positive relation between the foreign exchange and their market
value. This is confirmed in the more simple specification as in column (B) of
Table (A) makes clear.
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Our results for the year 2000 are presented in Table H.2. They resemble
the ones of 2001. Both hedge and speculation once again did not anymore
affect the relation between the exchange rate exposure and their foreign oper-
ational exposure. Finally, Table H.3 presents the results for 1999 which once
again are very similar to the ones of 2000 and 2001.
The year 2002 seems to be unique as far as speculation and hedge are
concerned. Firms that were able to speculate or hedge improved their market
value. On the contrary the low volatility of the exchange rate in the other
years did not provide the right incentives for firms to speculate or hedge with
foreign exchange derivatives.
The results indicate that the year 2002 was particularly atypical in terms
of incentives placed for speculation. Possessing privileged information in the
market made exporters take advantage of these incentives in 2002. In the next
section, we start testing the robustness of our results.
5 Robustness Analyses
5.1 Panel Analysis
In our first attempt to test the robustness of the results, we use a balanced
panel for the years from 1999 to 2002, such as equation (3) below. We interact
a dummy variable indicating the year 2002 with speculation or hedge. We use
a random effects panel.14
βf it = δ0 + δ1opsit + δ2 (spec ∗ ops)it + δ3 (spec ∗ ops ∗ y2002)it +
δ4 (hedge ∗ ops)it + δ3 (hedge ∗ ops ∗ y2002)it + δ5 (size)it +
δ6multit + δ7partit + δ8ioit + δ9imobit + δ10mvbvit + ai + uit ,
t = 2002,2001,2000,1999 e i = 1,50
(3)
where y2002 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 for
other years, ai is the fixed effects and the other variables are the same as in
equation (2).
Table I.1 shows again that the year 2002 was special for speculation or
hedge. Let us start with the results of speculation. All firms that speculated
as we said had positive operational exposure. The coefficient of the interac-
tion between speculation, operational exposure and the year 2002 is positive
0.03 and significant (p-value 0.04). This means that firms that speculated at
2002 saw a positive relation between their exchange rate and their foreign in-
volvement. Something similar happened for the more simplified specification,
the value of the coefficient 0.05 and p-value 0.01.
For the firms that hedged the results are similar to the previous ones. As
we pointed out above all firms that hedged had negative operational expo-
sure. The coefficient of the interaction between hedge, operational exposure
and the year 2002 is negative −0.07 and significant (p-value 0.02). The sum of
the operational exposure with the term that interacts with the hedge variable
is negative and significant. This means that firms that hedged observed a neg-
ative relation between their foreign exchange involvement and their exchange
rate exposure.
14The p-value of the Haussman test is 0,40.
626 Oliveira Economia Aplicada, v.16, n.4
5.2 Changing the Definition of Operational Exposure
In our second attempt to test the robustness of the results, we changed our
definition of foreign operational exposure in two different ways. Firstly, we
extend the definition taking in consideration the net financial positions of
firms in foreign exchange. To get we this we calculated the net position as
the sum of the long positions in foreign exchange swaps with long position
in other foreign exchange assets, like bonds or participation in firms abroad.
Secondly, we move to a more simple operational definition considering only
exports minus imports.
Table J.1 and J.2 present the results of our estimations with these two dif-
ferent definitions. Once again, speculation and hedge were relevant in 2002
and show a positive relation between the exchange rate and the foreign ex-
change exposure in the case of firms that speculated and a negative relation
in the case of the firms that hedged.
5.3 Modifying Total Exports and Total Imports
In a third attempt to test the robustness of our results, we consider other val-
ues for total exports and imports. We consider only current export revenues
and import expenses, that is, those related to the 2002 fiscal year. Neverthe-
less, it is possible that exporter or importer firms decide to speculate or hedge
in a certain year taking into account the expected value of future fluxes of ex-
port revenues and import expenses. To analyze this possibility, we supposed
that the expected future values of these revenues or expenses are equal to their
2002 values. We then defined foreign operational exposure as the present
value of export revenues minus the sum of debt in dollar and the present
value of import expenses. Note, however, that the positions of hedging, neu-
tral speculation and reverse speculation continue to be defined by the sign
of the product between the net position of open swaps and the operational
currency exposure.
We verify that the change in the definition of operational currency expo-
sure does not alter the classification of hedging and speculation for any of
the 93 corporations with open positions in currency swaps nor our previous
results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, our purpose was to study the relation between the foreign ex-
change rate and the foreign exchange involvement of firms in Brazil. In partic-
ular, we wanted to answer the following question: Did speculation or hedge
have any effect in this relation?
To obtain our results we built an original database of 74,567 contracts of
foreign exchange swaps written between corporations and financial institu-
tions from January 1999 to December 2002. Of these 25,457 are open at the
end of 2002. Looking at these contracts we identified 93 corporations with
open position in foreign exchange swaps. Of these 93 corporations, 53 de-
manded swaps in order to hedge. Or rather, the contracts to swap reduce the
firms’ exposure to currency risk and 40 firms demanded derivatives to specu-
late.
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Our results show that corporations that speculated in 2002 observed a pos-
itive relation between their foreign operational exchange exposure — defined
as the difference between total exports and the sum of total imports and for-
eign exchange debt — and their exchange rate exposure, defined as the elas-
ticity of the market value of the firm in respect to the exchange rate. However
firms that had negative operational exposure and that did not hedge observed
a positive relation between their foreign involvement and their exchange rate
exposure.
We compare our results of the year 2002 with the results of hedge and spec-
ulation of the years from 1999 to 2001. In these years the foreign exchange
rate was much less volatile and average depreciation much less significant
than in 2002. What we observe is that clearly 2002 is a very unique year as
far as speculation and hedge is concerned. We show that during these years
speculation or hedge did not matter for the relationship between the exchange
rate and the foreign operational exposure of firms.
In summary, this study indicates that, in periods of great volatility of the
exchange rate-as in the year 2002 — the incentives for hedge and speculate
were so relevant that they impacted significantly the exchange rate exposure
and therefore the market value of firms.
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Figure A.1: Foreign Exchange rate in Brazil in our Sample Period
Appendix B Financial Characteristics
This table presents the financial and accounting characteristics of the firms
that demanded currency swaps and of those that did not. The sample of the
firms is formed by a group of 343 non-financial open capital corporations.
They were not of the same economic group, divulged all of the necessary ac-
counting information and have some form of exchange rate exposure. All of
the information is from the end of the 2002 fiscal year, and relative to the fi-
nancial statements that are available at CVM. The existence of external debt
is equal to one when a firm possesses debt in dollars and zero otherwise; the
participation of administrators in profit is equal to one when administrators
participate in profit and zero otherwise; tax is equal to one when the firm
pays tax and zero otherwise; institutional investors show the number of in-
stitutional investors of the firm; preferential shares are the book value of the
firm’s preferential shares. The number of observations of each characteristic
is in the second column (N). The t statistics are presented for the average test
between financial characteristics of the firms’ diverse categories. P-values are
in parentheses.
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Appendix C Hedge or Speculation
Table C.1 presents the corporations with open contracts of currency swaps in
2002 by type of position: hedge, or speculation. Swaps/ NW is the average
level in the industry of the ratio of net positions in currency swaps to net
worth. Table C.2 presents the firms that hedge and those that perform specu-
lation classified by sectors; the form in which they do so and if they possess
debt in dollars or not. Table C.3 presents the firms that hedge and those that
perform speculation classified by sectors; the form in which they do so and
if they have exports or imports in dollars. Table C.4 shows the origin of the
corporations that hedge, or that perform reverse or neutral speculation.
Table C.1: Types of Positions and Currency Exposures
Industries
Hedge Speculation
Net Position Swaps/NW Net Position Swaps/NW
Chemical / Petroleum 9 0 0.05 2 0 0.03
Food and Beverages 1 0 0.05 7 0 0.04
Mining / Metallurgy 2 0 0.01 0 0 N.A.
Electro / Electronic
Equipment
6 0 0.08 5 0 0.026
Transportation 3 0 0.05 0 0 N.A.
Utilities for Public Ser-
vice
19 0 0.06 0 0 N.A.
Textiles 5 0 0.04 0 0 N.A
Metallurgy 6 0 0.07 2 0 0.03
Other 2 0 0.04 0 0 N.A
Total (long + short) 53 16
Table C.2: Hedge and Reverse Speculation — With and Without Debt in
Dollar
Industries
Hedge Speculation
Total
With Debt Without Debt With Debt Without Debt
Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long
Chemical and
Petroleum
9 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 11
Food and Beverages 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 8
Mining and Metallurgy 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4
Electro / Electronic
Equiptment
6 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 11
Transportation 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Utilities of Public Ser-
vice
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
Textiles 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Metallurgy 6 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 8
Other 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total (with debt + with-
out debt)
53 0 10 0 63
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Table C.3: Hedge and Reverse Speculation — Exports and Imports
Industries
Hedge Speculation
Total
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long
Chemical and
Petroleum
4 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 8
Food and Beverages 0 0 0 0 7 0 4 0 11
Mining and Metallurgy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electro / Electronic
Equiptment
3 0 3 0 5 0 2 0 13
Transportation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Utilities of Public Ser-
vice
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Textiles 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
Metallurgy 6 0 6 0 2 0 2 0 16
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total (with debt + with-
out debt)
17 14 15 8 54
Table C.4: Hedge and Speculation—Origin
of Capital
Origin of Capital Hedge Speculation
Domestic 44 13
State-owned 5 1
Multinational 4 2
Total 53 16
Appendix D Hedge and Speculation in Other Years
Table D.1 presents the corporations with open contracts of currency swaps in
1999. by type of position: hedge, speculation. Table D.2 presents the corpora-
tions with open contracts in 2000 by type of position: hedge and speculation
and Table D.3 presents the corporations with open contracts in 2001 by type
of position: hedge and speculation. The firm hedges when the product be-
tween its operational currency exposure, defined as the difference between
export revenues and the sum of import expenses and debt in dollars, and its
open positions in currency swaps is less than zero. The firm speculates when
the product between its operational currency exposure, defined as the differ-
ence between export revenues and the sum of import expenses and debt in
dollars, and its open positions in currency swaps is greater than zero. Swaps/
NW is the average level in the industry of the ratio of net positions in currency
swaps to net worth.
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Table D.1: Hedge and Speculation 1999
Industries
Hedge Speculation
Net Position
Swaps/NW
Net Position
Swaps/NW
Long Short Long Short
Chemical / Petroleum 1 0 0.01 2 0 0.02
Food and Beverages 1 0 0.06 2 0 0.07
Mining / Metallurgy 0 0 0 0 0 N.A.
Electro / Electronic
Equipment
3 0 0.02 4 0 0.07
Transportation 1 0 0.01 0 0 N.A.
Utilities for Public Ser-
vice
8 0 0.08 1 0 0.04
Textiles 1 0 0.02 0 0 N.A
Metallurgy 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.03
Other 6 0 0.05 0 2 0.09
Total (long + short) 21 9
Table D.2: Hedge and Speculation 2000
Industries
Hedge Speculation
Net Position
Swaps/NW
Net Position
Swaps/NW
Long Short Long Short
Chemical / Petroleum 3 0 0.03 0 1 0.01
Food and Beverages 2 0 0.04 1 0 0.01
Mining / Metallurgy 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electro / Electronic
Equipment
4 0 0.06 0 0 0
Transportation 2 0 0.02 0 1 0.03
Utilities for Public Ser-
vice
9 0 0.09 0 1 0.06
Textiles 4 0 0.04 0 0 0
Metallurgy 0 0 0.09 0 0 0
Other 8 0 0.06 0 1 0.1
Total (long + short) 32 5
Table D.3: Hedge and Speculation 2001
Industries
Hedge Speculation
Net Position
Swaps/NW
Net Position
Swaps/NW
Long Short Long Short
Chemical / Petroleum 3 0 0.03 2 0 0.01
Food and Beverages 2 0 0.04 4 0 0.01
Mining / Metallurgy 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electro / Electronic
Equipment
4 0 0.06 5 0 0
Transportation 2 0 0.02 0 0 0.03
Utilities for Public Ser-
vice
9 0 0.09 0 0 0.06
Textiles 4 0 0.04 0 0 0
Metallurgy 0 0 0.09 2 0 0
Other 16 0 0.06 0 0 0.1
Total (long + short) 40 13
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Appendix E Firms with More Liquids Stocks: Speculation and
Hedge
This table presents the financial and accounting characteristics of the firms
that had more liquid stocks in Brazil with open positions in foreign exchange
swaps at the end of 2002. We compare the financial characteristics of these
firms with a group of 250 corporations that at the end of 2002 were not among
the firms with more liquid shares and with our original group of 93 firms that
had outstanding swap positions in foreign exchange rate. All of the informa-
tion is from the end of the 2002 fiscal year, and relative to the financial state-
ments that are available at CVM. The existence of external debt is equal to one
when a firm possesses debt in dollars and zero otherwise; the participation of
administrators in profit is equal to one when administrators participate in
profit and zero otherwise; tax is equal to one when the firm pays tax and zero
otherwise; institutional investors show the number of institutional investors
of the firm; preferential shares are the book value of the firm’s preferential
shares. The number of observations of each characteristic is in the second
column (N). The t statistics are presented for the average test between finan-
cial characteristics of the firms’ diverse categories. The tests suppose equal
variances unless the hypothesis is rejected at 5%. P-values are in parentheses.
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Appendix F Foreign Exchange and Market Value: First Step
Regressions
In Table F.1 we estimate equation (1) in the text using OLSWe estimate this re-
gression for the years from 1999 to 2002 using OLS. We correct all regressions
for heterocedasticity and autocorrelation when necessary with Newey &West
(1987). Below the estimated coefficients, in parentheses, are the p-values. In
Table F.2 we use weighted least squares to estimate a system of equations of
the equation for all years using daily data.
Table F.1: Descriptive Statistics of Betas Univariate Estimation
1999 2000 2001 2002 1999 to 2002
Min −0.46
(0.14)
−0.65
(0.10)
−0.61
(0.09)
−0.68
(0.08)
−0.41
(0.25)
First Quartile −0.24
(0.15)
−0.36
(0.0)
−0.42
(0.21)
−0.48
(0.16)
−0.39
(0.04)
Median 0.05
(0.03)
0.09
(0.04)
0.11
(0.36)
0.03
(0.23)
0.01
(0.54)
Third Quartile 0.31
(0.14)
0.50
(0.29)
0.48
(0.31)
0.53
(0.03)
0.37
(0.0)
Maximum 0.51
(0.0)
0.61
(0.23)
0.68
(0.02)
0.70
(0.04)
0.55
(0.0)
Cross Sectional Mean −0.10
(0.48)
−0.15
(0.35)
0.02
(0.06)
0.16
(0.02)
−0.05
(0.21)
Stability of firmsSame sign 34%
1999 and 2000 28%
2000 and 2001 84%
2001 and 2002 19%
2 subperiods
3 subperiods
Number of Observations 50 50 50 50 50
Table F.2: System Estimation with Weighted Least squares
1999 2000 2001 2002
Avg
Expo-
sure
Equal
foreign
exposure
Avg
Expo-
sure
Equal
foreign
exposure
Avg
Expo-
sure
Equal
foreign
exposure
Avg
Expo-
sure
Equal
foreign
exposure
30 firms
more
liquids
−0.36
(0.45)
(0.22) −0.65
(0.10)
(0.02) −0.85
(0.15)
(0.12) −0.68
(0.08)
(0.0)
50 firms
more
liquids
−0.18
(0.35)
(0.34) −0.36
(0.0)
(0.0) −0.46
(0.08)
(0.11) −0.48
0.16)
(0.03)
Firms that
speculated
(0.14
(0.23)
(0.18) (0.09
(0.04)
(0.05) (0.09
(0.24)
(0.02) (0.23
(0.23)
(0.0)
Firms that
Hedged
−0.41
(0.08)
(0.0) −0.11
(0.23)
(0.23) −0.21
(0.03)
(0.0) −0.51
(0.04)
(0.0)
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Appendix G Foreign Exchange and Market Value: Second Step
Regressions 2002
We estimate equation (2) in the text. We use OLS. The dependents variables
are the exchange rate exposures. We regress them for every year against the
following variables related to the theoretical reasons for firms to speculate and
hedge with foreign exchange derivatives: ops is foreign operational exposure,
defined as the difference between exports and the sum of imports and foreign
exchange debt;spec is equal to 1 if the firms speculated, hedge is equal to 1 if
the firm hedged; mult is equal to one if the firm is multinational; fixedassets
is the total fixed assets of the firm divided by total assets; size is the the log
of the total assets of the firms; mvbv is the quotient between the market value
of firms and their book value; part is one if the executives have participation
in the profits of the firms; II are the number of institutional investors of the
firms. We correct for heterocedasticity when necessary with Newey & West
(1987). P-values are in parenthesis.
Table G.1: Foreign Exchange and Market Value: Second Step
Regressions 2002
Exchange Rate Exposure
(A) (B)
Constant 0.012
(0.76)
−0.053
−0.03
Ops 0.24
(0.06)
0.27
(0.05)
spec*ops −0.0034
(0.08)
−0.003
(0.07)
Hedge*ops −0.48
(0.06)
−0.61
(0.0)
Size 9.22
(0.09)
-
mvbv −0.00075
(0.65)
-
II 1.31
(0.65)
-
fixedassets 0.92
(0.09)
-
Part −2.70
(0.10)
-
Mult −1.11
(0.07)
-
Wald Test (ops*spec+ops) = 0 0.24
(0.04)
0.27
(0.04)
Wald Test (ops*hedge+ops) = 0 −0.24
(0.04)
−0.34
(0.0)
R2 0.31 0.13
R2 Adj 0.18 0.10
White Heterocedasticity (0.14) (0.04)
F test (0.05) (0.02)
Number of Observations 50 50
Exchange Rate Exposure of Firms 637
Appendix H Foreign Exchange and Market Value: Second Step
Regressions for 1999 to 2001
We estimate equation (2) in the text. We use OLS. The dependent variables
are the exchange rate exposures. We regress them for every year against the
following variables related to the theoretical reasons for firms to speculate and
hedge with foreign exchange derivatives: ops is foreign operational exposure,
defined as the difference between exports and the sum of imports and foreign
exchange debt; spec is equal to 1 if the firms speculated, hedge is equal to 1 if
the firm hedged; mult is equal to one if the firm is multinational; fixedassets
is the total fixed assets of the firm divided by total assets; size is the the log of
the total assets of the firms; vmbv is the quotient between the market value
of firms and their book value; part is one if the executives have participation
in the profits of the firms; II are the number of institutional investors of the
firms. We correct for heterocedasticity when necessary with Newey & West
(1987). P-values are in parenthesis.
Table H.1: Hedge and Speculation 2001
Exchange Rate Exposure
(A) (B)
Constant 0.005
(0.93)
0.005
(0.93)
Ops 0.21
(0.19)
0.21
(0.19)
spec*ops −0.00086
(0.06)
−0.007
(0.05)
Hedge*ops −0.48
(0.06)
−0.61
(0.0)
Size 2.3
(0.05)
-
mvbv −0.07
(0.44)
-
II −0.13
(0.18)
-
fixedassets 0.17
(0.37)
-
Part 0.13
(0.30)
-
Mult −0.39
(0.02)
-
Wald Test (ops*spec+ops) = 0 (0.01) (0.02)
Wald Test (ops*hedge+ops) = 0 (0.07) (0.01)
R2 0.24 0.24
R2 Adj 0.098 0.098
White Heterocedasticity (0.10) (0.01)
F test (0.13) (0.23)
Number of Observations 50
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Table H.2: Hedge and Speculation 2000
Exchange Rate Exposure
(A) (B)
Constant 0.03
(0.43)
−0.03
(−0.08)
Ops 0.31
(0.09)
0.84
(0.96)
spec*ops 0.076
(0.36)
1.8
(0.29)
Hedge*ops −0.35
(0.45)
−0.02
(0.45)
Size −0.09
(0.24)
-
mvbv −0.23
(0.09)
-
II 0.47
(0.17)
-
fixedassets 0.33
(0.43)
-
Part −0.59
(0.04)
-
Mult −0.23
(0.01)
-
Wald Test (ops*spec+ops) = 0 (0.15) (0.31)
Wald Test (ops*hedge+ops) = 0 (0.64) (0.42)
R2 0.44 0.15
R2 Adj 0.34 0.14
White Heterocedasticity (0.08) (0.59)
F test (0.03) (0.86)
Number of Observations 50
Table H.3: Hedge and Speculation 1999
Exchange Rate Exposure
(A) (B)
Constant 0.15
(0.093)
−0.28
(−0.09)
Ops 0.31
(0.29)
0.89
(0.06)
spec*ops 0.76
(0.16)
1.34
(0.21)
Hedge*ops −0.13
(0.04)
−0.01
(0.87)
Size 0.08
(0.04)
-
mvbv −0.23
(0.18)
-
II 0.27
(0.17)
-
fixedassets 0.23
(0.10)
-
Part −0.56
(0.04)
-
Mult −0.67
(0.34)
-
Wald Test (ops*spec+ops) = 0 (0.18) (0.11)
Wald Test (ops*hedge+ops) = 0 (0.67)* 0.87
(0.43)
R2 0.19 0.11
R2 Adj (0.09) (0.29)
White Heterocedasticity (0.13) (0.86)
F test (0.08) (0.25)
Number of Observations 50
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Appendix I Foreign Exchange and Market Value: Second Step
Regressions Balanced Panel Analysis (Random
Effects)
We estimate equation (3) in the text. We use random effects. The dependent
variables are the exchange rate exposures. We regress them for every year
against the following variables related to the theoretical reasons for firms to
speculate and hedge with foreign exchange derivatives: ops is foreign oper-
ational exposure, defined as the difference between exports and the sum of
imports and foreign exchange debt; spec is equal to 1 if the firms speculated,
hedge is equal to 1 if the firm hedged; mult is equal to one if the firm is multi-
national; fixedassets is the total fixed assets of the firm divided by total assets;
size is the the log of the total assets of the firms; mvbv is the quotient between
the market value of firms and their book value; part is one if the executives
have participation in the profits of the firms; ii are the number of institutional
investors of the firms. We correct for heterocedasticity when necessary with
Newey & West (1987). P-values are in parenthesis.
Table I.1: Foreign Exchange and Market Value: Second
Step Regressions Balanced Panel Analysis (Random Ef-
fects)
Exchange Rate Exposure
(A) (B)
Constant −0.54
(0.03)
−0.015
(0.0765)
Ops 0.31
(0.07)
0.52
(0.03)
spec*ops
spec*ops*y2002 0.03
(0.04)
0.05
(0.01)
Hedge*ops −0.42
(0.03)
Hedge*ops*y2002 −0,13
(0.00)
−0.07
(0.02)
Size −0.23
(0.04)
-
mvbv −0.73
(0.34)
-
II 0.012
(0.39)
-
fixedassets 0.17
(0.19)
-
Part 0.34
(0.51)
-
Mult*2002 0.18
(0.08)
-
R2 Adj 0.34 0.21
White Heterocedasticity (0.34) (0.52)
F test (0.00) (0.04)
Number of Observations 50
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Appendix J Foreign Exchange and Market Value: Changing the
Definition of Foreign Operational Exposure
We changed our definition of foreign operational exposure in two different
ways. In the first place, we extended the definition taking in consideration
the net financial positions of firms in foreign exchange. To get we this we cal-
culated the net position as the sum of the long positions in foreign exchange
swaps with long position in other foreign exchange assets, like bonds or partic-
ipation in firms abroad. In the second place, we moved to a more simple oper-
ational definition considering only exports minus imports. Table J.1 presents
the results for net financial positions. Table J.2 presents the results for the op-
erational definition. We estimate equation (2) in the text with these two new
definitions. We correct for heterocedasticity when necessary with Newey &
West (1987). P-values are in parenthesis.
Table J.1: Financial Positions Definition
Exchange Rate Exposure
(A) (B)
Constant 0.03
(0.43)
0.03
(0.43)
Ops 0.31
(0.09)
0.81
(0.09)
spec*ops 0.0076
(0.04)
0.56
(0.36)
Hedge*ops −0.51
(0.05)
−1.25
(0.01)
Size −0.09
(0.24)
-
mvbv −0.23
(0.09)
-
II 0.47
(0.17)
-
fixedassets 0.33
(0.43)
-
Part −0.59
(0.04)
-
Mult −0.07
(0.08)
-
Wald Test (ops*spec+ops) = 0 0.31
(0.01)
1.37
(0.15)
Wald Test (ops*hedge+ops) = 0 −0.20
(0.02)
−0.44
(0.01)
R2 0.34 0.34
R2 Adj 0.32 0.28
White Heterocedasticity (0.66) (0.76)
F test (0.08) (0.03)
Number of Observations 50
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Table J.2: Operational Definition
Exchange Rate Exposure
(A) (B)
Constant 0.009
(0.82)
−0.04
(0.04)
Ops 0.43
(0.0)
0.50
(0.0)
spec*ops 0.0
(0.06)
−0.0006
(0.0)
Hedge*ops −1.87
(0.14)
−1.50
(0.02)
Size −0.0006
(0.10)
-
mvbv 0.383
(0.10)
-
II 0.78
(0.52)
-
fixedassets −0.29
(0.14)
-
Part 0.12
(0.06)
-
Mult −0.23
(0.84)
-
Wald Test (ops*spec+ops) = 0 0.43
(0.04)
0.57
(0.06)
R2 0.20 0.13
R2 Adj 0.17 0.11
White Heterocedasticity (0.15) (0.31)
F test (0.14) (0.89)
Number of Observations 50
